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Note
Corporal Punishment:
The Nebraska Law
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
I. INTRODUCTION
In a five to four decision,' the United States Supreme Court held
that the eighth amendment sanction against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment does not apply to corporal punishment 2 in the public
schools. The Supreme Court also held that, although deliberate re-
straint and subsequent infliction of physical pain on school children
by school authorities, acting under color of state law, does implicate
fourteenth amendment liberty interests,3 notice and a hearing is not
required by the due process clause "prior to the imposition of corpo-
ral punishment in the public schools, as that practice is authorized
and limited by the common law."
'4
Mr. Justice White authored a spirited dissent which attacked the
majority's view as extreme in holding that "corporal punishment in
public schools, no matter how barbaric, inhumane, or severe, is
never limited by the Eighth Amendment." 5 As to the fourteenth
amendment issue, the dissent, in light of the Supreme Court's rea-
soning in Goss v. Lopez,6 found no justification for the abdication
1. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
2. Corporal punishment has since been defined by an amendment to the
Florida statute under which Ingraham and Andrews were punished as
"the moderate use of physical force or physical contact by a teacher
or principal as may be necessary to maintain discipline or to enforce
school rules." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 228.041(28) (West 1977). For a de-
tailed account of the statutory and school board policy history of the
Ingraham decision, see 430 U.S. 651, 655-56, nn.6 & 7.
3. 430 U.S. at 675.
4. Id. at 682.
5. Id. at 691 (White, J., dissenting).
6. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
Disciplinarians, although proceeding in utmost good faith, fre-
quently act on the reports and advice of others; and the con-
trolling facts and the nature of the conduct under challenge
are often disputed. The risk of error is not at all trivial, and
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of due process guarantees in favor of the state statutory or common
law limitations on corporal punishment. The dissent pointed out
that not only do such common law remedies arise after the fact, but
they protect the student only against unreasonable or bad faith er-
ror.7 Any reasonable, good faith mistake in the school disciplinary
process, the Court's concern in Goss,8 would not be protected
against by the remedial, traditional common law remedies relied
upon by the majority.
Because of the clear and uncomplex nature of the reasoning in
both the majority9 and dissenting1 ° opinions and the explicitness of
the Court's refusal to extend either eighth or fourteenth amend-
ment sanctions to the imposition of corporal punishment in public
schools, this note will not engage in a detailed analysis of the Su-
preme Court's reasoning. Instead, this note will examine the legal
issues that remain for the Nebraska attorney and educator in the
wake of the Court's decision to defer to state law on the subject of
corporal punishment.
II. THE FACTS
On January 7, 1971, James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews
filed a complaint" in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Florida naming as defendants the school officials of the
Charles R. Drew Junior High School of Dade County, Florida. 2
it should be guarded against if that may be done without pro-
hibitive cost or interference with the educational process.
Id. at 580 (emphasis added). To guard against the punishment of an
innocent student, the Court in Goss required under the Due Process
Clause "an informal give-and-take between student and disciplinar-
ian" affording the student "an opportunity to explain his version of
the facts." Id. at 580, 582, 584.
7. 430 U.S. at 694 n.11 (White, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 693 n.10.
9. Id. at 670. The Court reasoned that due process was adequately af-
forded by the common law remedies. The Court saw no need to ex-
tend the protection of the eighth amendment to school children in
light of the same common law principles: "Public school teachers and
administrators are privileged at common law to inflict only such cor-
poral punishment as is reasonably necessary for the proper education
and discipline of the child; any punishment going beyond the privilege
may result in both civil and criminal liability." Id. See also notes 19-
23 and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 5-7 and accompanying text supra.
11. The complaint contained three counts alleging deprivation of constitu-
tional rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 (1970). The first two counts
were individual damage actions based on paddlings which occurred in
October, 1970, while Ingraham was in the eighth grade and Andrews
in the ninth.
12. Defendants named in all three counts were "Willie J. Wright (princi-
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Petitioners' evidence was presented in a week-long trial after which
the district court dismissed the complaint. 1 3 The court held that,
although the eighth amendment could be violated by some types of
corporal punishment, "in this case a jury could not lawfully find
'the elements of severity, arbitrary infliction, unacceptability in
terms of contemporary standards, or gross disproportion which are
necessary to bring punishment to the constitutional level of cruel
and unusual.'
u4
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit voted to
reverse 13 concluding that, upon the facts of this case, the eighth and
fourteenth amendments were violated.16 The court of appeals en
banc rejected these conclusions and affirmed the district court.
17
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, limited to the questions of
cruel and unusual punishment and procedural due process.' 8
III. THE DECISION
The Supreme Court, in rejecting the eighth amendment chal-
lenge to corporal punishment in public schools,' 9 first examined an-
cient common law privileges governing the infliction of corporal
punishment. The majority found present-day viability in the com-
mon law as it has existed "since before the American Revolution.1
20
The Court acknowledged as unchanged the common law privilege
pal at Drew Junior High School), Lemmie Deliford (an assistant prin-
cipal), Solomon Barnes (an assistant to the principal), and Edward L.
Whigham (superintendent of the Dade County School System)." Ing-
raham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 654.
13. The dismissal was granted with leave to appeal. The district court
was reversed in Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1974), va-
cated, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976), affd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
14. 430 U.S. at 658.
15. Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 525 F.2d 909
(5th Cir. 1976), affd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
16. 430 U.S. at 658. The facts from the testimony of sixteen students sug-
gest the administration at the junior high to be extremely severe.
Ingraham testified that because he responded slowly to his teacher's
instructions he was held over a table in the principal's office and
struck more than 20 times with a paddle, suffering hematoma requir-
ing medical attention. Ingraham missed 11 days of school as a result
of his injuries. Andrews lost the full use of his arm for a week as a
result of one paddling in which he was struck on the arms.
For an additional summary of the evidence presented, see Ingra-
ham v. Wright, 498 F.2d at 256-59.
17. Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976), affd, 430 U.S. 651
(1977).
18. Ingraham v. Wright, 425 U.S. 990 (1976).
19. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
20. Id. at 661.
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of school teachers to inflict reasonable corporal punishment on chil-
dren. Particular departures from reasonable punishment were pre-
sumed by the Court to be remedied in virtually all states by the pos-
sibility of teachers being subjected to criminal or civil liabilities.
21
Analyzing the eighth amendment as applicable only to the pro-
tection of those persons convicted of crimes, the Court held that the
eighth amendment's sanction against cruel and unusual punishment
did not apply to the paddling of children in the public schools for
disciplinary purposes. Therefore, the Court reasoned, the only re-
maining "pertinent constitutional question [was] whether the im-
position [of corporal punishment] is consistent with the require-
ments of due process. '2 2 Although the Court found in its due proc-
ess analysis that a constitutionally protected liberty interest was
implicated by the imposition of corporal punishment, it held "that
the traditional common law remedies are fully adequate to afford
due process.
'23
However, to present the Court's decision as judicial approval of
corporal punishment, even to the excesses of the Ingraham case,
24
could be misleading in light of the majority's deference to the com-
mon law on both the cruel and unusual punishment and due process
issues. Because of this deference, an investigation of the Nebraska
law in the area is essential to anyone faced with a challenge to, or
anyone challenging, the infliction of corporal punishment upon any
student in the public schools of this state.
IV. THE NEBRASKA PRIVILEGE
A. Civil Liability
1. Assault and Battery
The earliest common law comments on corporal punishment
made it clear the courts were to tolerate such punishment.25 Under
the doctrine of in loco parentis the courts analyzed the rights of
teachers to punish students as derivative of the parental right of
punishment. 26 The British Court of the Queen's Bench of 1893
summed up the common law doctrine:
21. For examples of cases discussing such liability, see id. at 1408 n.28.
See generally I F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 288-92
(1956); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 136-37 (4th ed. 1971); Proehl, Tort
Liability of Teachers, 12 VAND. L. REV. 723, 734-38 (1959).
22. 430 U.S. at 671.
23. Id. at 672.
24. See note 16 supra.
25. Cleary v. Booth, [1893] 1 Q.B. 465.
26. See generally sources cited in note 20 supra.
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It is clear that a father has the right to inflict reasonable personal
chastisement on his son. It is equally the law, and it is in accord-
ance with very ancient practice, that he may delegate the right to
the schoolmaster. Such a right has always commended itself to the
common sense of mankind. It is clear that the relation of master
and pupil carries with it the right of reasonable corporal chastise-
ment.2 7
The Nebraska Supreme Court acknowledged this doctrine in
Clasen v. Pruhs28 stating that "[a] parent, teacher or master is not
liable either civilly or criminally for moderately correcting a child,
pupil, or apprentice, but it is otherwise if the correction is immoder-
ate or unreasonable.
'29
The court in Clasen reasoned that it was an elemental principle
of modern civilization that "there is and should be a reasonable lim-
itation on the right of parents [or their representatives] to punish
their offspring.
'30
The decision as to whether an educdtor had administered "unrea-
sonable, unnecessary and cruel punishment to a child. .. [was to
be] a question of fact to be determined by the jury. '3 1 This stan-
dard and mode of determination outlined in Clasen was the common
law standard of reasonableness to which the Ingraham Court re-
ferred in its reliance on the adequacy of civil and criminal remedies
available in virtually all states.
3 2
It can readily be seen that a broad range of teacher discretion
in the imposition of corporal punishment is permissible under the
Clasen standard of reasonableness. Neither the school child nor the
school employee can act with certainty while functioning under
such a vague standard. Since the Nebraska Supreme Court has
never dealt directly with corporal punishment of public school chil-
dren, it is necessary, in order to clarify the dimensions of the com-
mon law standard of reasonableness, to investigate the factors con-
sidered by other courts in their dealings with the issue.
The Clasen standard is consistent with the great weight of au-
thority in that as long as public school officials acted reasonably in
27. [1893] 1 Q.B. at 468 (emphasis added).
28. 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640 (1903). The Nebraska Supreme Court has
never specifically dealt with the issue of corporal punishment in the
public schools, but acknowledges in Clasen the common law doctrine
relative to that issue.
29. Id. at 283, 95 N.W. at 642.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 284, 95 N.W. at 642.
32. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 662. "All of the circumstances are
to be taken into account [by the trier of fact] in determining whether
the punishment is reasonable in a particular case." Id.
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administering corporal punishment, they were shielded from liabil-
ity by the common law privilege.33 The courts, in their individual
determinations of reasonableness, commonly looked to all the cir-
cumstances of each particular case.34 These circumstances usually
included such factors as the nature of the pupil's offense,35 the na-
ture and severity of the punishment, 36 the age and physical condi-
tion of the pupil,3 7 the motive of the school official who inflicted
the punishment, 38 the attitude and past behavior of the pupil, and
the availability of less severe but equally effective means of disci-
pline.39
Burden of proof was almost always on the student to convince
the court that the punishment inflicted by the teacher was unrea-
sonable.40  Some jurisdictions even went so far as to require the
student to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the punishment
was clearly excessive 41 or that the injury inflicted was permanent.
42
Additionally, there almost invariably was a strong presumption
that the teacher acted properly.
4 3
Such jurisprudence and the standards resulting therefrom were
patently arbitrary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction-often even
from case to case within a single jurisdiction- 44 with the student
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 147-55 (1965) (detailing fac-
tors to be considered in judging reasonableness); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d
469, 476-85 (1955): Comment, Right of a Teacher to Administer Corpo-
ral Punishment to a Student, 5 WASHBURN L.J. 75 (1965).
34. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 662. See generally I F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, supra note 21, at 290-91; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 150 Comments c-e (1965).
35. See, e.g., Vanvactor v. State, 113 Ind. 276, 15 N.E. 341 (1888).
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Tinkham v. Kole, 252 Iowa 1303, 110 N.W.2d 258 (1961).
38. See, e.g., Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So. 2d 49 (1954).
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 147-55 (1965)..
40. Tinkham v. Kole, 252 Iowa 1303, 110 N.W.2d 258 (1961).
41. Patterson v. Nutter, 78 Me. 509, 7 A. 273 (1886).
42. Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So. 2d 49 (1954). See also Drum v.
Miller, 135 N.C. 204, 47 S.E. 421 (1904) (excessive punishment held not
actionable even if injury was permanent unless such permanency was
reasonably foreseeable as natural and probable from the act of pun-
ishment).
43. Drake v. Thomas, 310 Ill. App. 57, 33 N.E.2d 889 (1941); Markbary v.
State, 10 Ind. App. 21, 37 N.E. 558 (1894); Haycraft v. Griggsby, 88 Mo.
App. 354, aff'd mem., 94 Mo. App. 74, 67 S.W. 965 (1902) (presumption
disappears with the introduction of evidence, thus requiring the weight
of the evidence to decide the case).
44. See, e.g., People v. Ball, 58 Ill. 2d 36, 317 N.E.2d 54 (1974) (teacher
abused authority by paddling student); People v. DeCaro, 17 Ill. App.
3d 553, 308 N.E.2d 196 (1974) (teacher within authority to strike stu-
dent with a ruler).
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assured of successfully challenging the privileged battery in only
the most severe cases.
45
2. Negligence
Corporal punishment is by definition an intentional tort. The
common law privilege of Clasen attaches to the actions of a teacher
or administrator in litigation for damages resulting from the inten-
tional tort of assault or battery.
A different analysis results in an action for teacher negligence
in the infliction of corporal punishment. The initial premise of the
analysis is that "although teachers may stand in loco parentis as re-
gards the enforcement of authority, teachers do not stand in loco
parentis with regard to their negligent acts. A teacher is civilly lia-
ble for negligently causing the injury of a child, while a parent of
the child is not.' 46 As a result, the analysis of negligence in a fact
situation involving corporal punishment is not substantially differ-
ent than any negligence analysis.
47
The fact finding in negligence would differ from that of assault
and battery:
We are not here concerned with the law applicable to punishment
of a pupil by a teacher; but rather with the law applicable to the
duties of a teacher in the care and custody of a pupil. In the faith-
ful discharge of such duties the teacher is bound to use reasonable
care, tested in the light of the existing relationship.48
In assault and battery, the jury must determine if a reasonable
man would believe the punishment was "unreasonable, unnecessary
and cruel"'49 under the circumstances. 50 Negligence fact finding re-
45. See, e.g., Serres v. South Santa Anna School Bd., 10 Cal. App. 2d 152,
51 P.2d 893 (1935) (fractured pupil's coccyx); Sheehan v. Sturges, 53
Conn. 481, 2 A. 841 (1885) (teacher wore out two whips on the pupil,
administered blows to the pupil's head and then kicked him in the
face); Frank v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 195 So. 2d 451 (La. App.
1967) (breaking pupil's arm).
46. Baird v. Hosmer, 46 Ohio St. 2d 273, 279, 347 N.E.2d 533, 537 (1976).
See also Eastman v. Williams, 124 Vt. 445, 207 A.2d 146 (1965).
47. For a thorough discussion of the analysis of school and teacher negli-
gence, see Proehl, supra note 21; Ripps, Tort Liability of the Classroom
Teacher, 9 AKRoN L. REV. 19 (1975); Seitz, Legal Responsibility Under
Tort Law of School Personnel and School Districts as Regards Negli-
gent Conduct Toward Pupils, 15 HAsTMnGs L.J. 495 (1964); Vacca,
Teacher Malpractice; 8 U. RICH. L. Rav. 447 (1974).
48. Gaincott v. Davis, 281 Mich. 515, 519, 275 N.W. 229, 231 (1937) (empha-
sis added). See also Segerman v. Jones, 256 Md. 109, 124-25, 259 A.2d
794, 801 (1969).
49. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
50. See notes 34-45 and accompanying text supra.
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quires the jury to determine that standard of care which a person of
ordinary prudence, charged with the particular duties, would exer-
cise under similar circumstances. 51
Theoretically, in the maintenance of classroom discipline the
professional educator draws upon expertise to effect choices among
various courses of action. Although in the ordinary negligence ac-
tion, any mistake in judgement "becomes negligent, in a legal sense,
by reason of the ability of a prudent man, in the exercise of ordi-
nary care, to foresee that harmful results will follow its commis-
sion, '52 an educator may be held to a higher standard than an ordi-
nary prudent man.53 Any mistake in judgement could be analo-
gized to malpractice cases and governed by those rules. If such an
analogy is accepted by a Nebraska court,54 the jury should be in-
structed in the following manner:
Whether errors of judgement will or will not make the defendant
expert liable in a given case depends not merely upon the fact that
he may be ordinarily skillful as such, but whether he has handled
the matter skillfully or has exercised such reasonable skill and dili-
gence as is ordinarily exercised in his business or profession.55
A problem may exist with this analogy and the standard against
which the analogy suggests the judgement of professional educators
should be gauged. Although feasibly applicable to other choices in
classroom discipline, 56 the higher standard is arguably inapplicable
to the infliction of corporal punishment simply because there is no
recognized special expertise in the use of force against children.
51. Luna v. Needles Elementary School Dist., 154 Cal. App. 2d 803, 316
P.2d 773 (1957).
52. Drum v. Miller, 135 N.C. 139, 147, 47 S.E. 421, 425 (1904).
53. The professional educator not only has a special relationship with the
child, but possesses unique training, special duty assignments, and
even a state license. These factors among others could establish a
higher standard of care than that of the ordinary prudent man.
54. The Nebraska Supreme Court hag recognized the standard of care re-
quired of an automobile wrecker operator in the righting of an over-
turned truck to be analogous to the malpractice, standard. Brown v.
Kaar, 178 Neb. 524, 134 N.W.2d 60 (1965). It would seem logical that
in light of such reasoning, the standard of care required of a profes-
sional educator prior to and at the infliction of corporal punishment
would likewise require an analogy to the malpractice standard.
55. Id. at 530, 134 N.W.2d at 65 (citing Johnson v. Winston, 68 Neb. 425,
94 N.W. 607 (1903); In re Estate of Johnson, 145 Neb. 333, 16 N.W.2d
504 (1944)) (emphasis added).
56. There may be decisions for which most educators are specially trained,
such as the evaluation of students' records or the analysis of test scores
for the purpose of diagnostic treatment of an identifiable physical or
intellectual deficiency. The educator could be held to a higher stand-
ard commensurate with the functional standards of the area of special-
ization in which he or she may be performing.
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Educators generally receive no special college training in the pad-
dling of students. If they should possess some innate talent or skill
in such activities, certainly the skill would be no higher that the
average prudent man's talent under the same circumstances.
In the final analysis there exists no significant difference be-
tween the requirement in negligence that a teacher's actions be
compared to some theoretically higher standard of skill, and the re-
quirement of assault and battery that the teacher's action be pre-
sumed reasonable or be proven by the student to be clearly exces-
sive.
57
B. Criminal Liability
In the case of a criminal prosecution against an educator for use
of force in student discipline, the Nebraska Legislature has consid-
erably altered the standard of Clasen and the common law devel-
oped more fully by other jurisdictions in their attempts to establish
civil standards of reasonableness. The use of force is now justified
in Nebraska criminal law if the educator believed that force was
necessary and consistent with the welfare of the minor, and if the
force exerted did not create substantial risk of serious injuries.
58
Although gross "unreasonableness of an alleged belief may be evi-
dence that it was not in fact held,"59 the requirements that the edu-
57. See notes 40-45 and accompanying text supra.
58. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1413 (Supp. 1977):
The use of force upon or toward the person of another is
justifiable if: . . . (2) The actor is a teacher . . .and: (a)
The actor believes that the force used is necessary to further
such special purpose, including the maintenance of reasonable
discipline in a school, class or other group, and that the use
of such force is consistent with the welfare of the minor; and
(b) The degree of force, if it had been used by the parent or
guardian of the minor, would not be unjustifiable under sub-
division (1) (b) of this section.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1413(1) (b) (Supp. 1977), defines the degree
of force permitted to be used by a parent and an educator to be
"[s]uch force [as] is not designed to cause or known to create a sub-
stantial risk of causing death, serious bodily harm, disfigurement, ex-
treme pain or mental distress or gross degradation."
The legislative history indicates that there were no amendments or
significant floor debate relating to the teacher's statutory privilege.
As a result, the intent of the legislature is unclear. Because both stat-
utory sections are taken directly from the MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08
(Proposed Official Draft 1962), this note will partially draw its inter-
pretation of the Nebraska statutes from the comments to the appro-
priate sections of the model code in the assumption that the Nebraska
Legislature adopted at least tacitly the statutory intent of the original
official committee.
59. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09, Comment (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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cator be reasonable in his belief and exert reasonable force are no
longer necessary to justify the use of force.
Obviously broader than the privilege against civil liability, 60 the
defense against a criminal prosecution for the use of force by an ed-
ucator is not, however, unbounded. If the educator culpably creates
substantial risk of excessive injuries as specified in section 28-1413
(1) (b) of the Nebraska Revised Statutes,61 the privilege will be un-
available and criminal liability may lie.
62
Furthermore, if the educator is prosecuted for an offense for
which recklessness or negligence suffice for conviction, the edu-
cator's reckless or negligent acquisition of his or her belief in the
justifiability of the use of force will make the privilege unavailable
to the defendant. 63 However, "caution should be exercised in find-
ing recklessness or negligence in forming the beliefs that are mate-
rial to justification.
'64
Although the infliction of serious injury or death upon a student
by an educator in Nebraska is unjustifiable in a criminal prosecu-
tion for such injury, the threat of successful criminal prosecution
for the exertion of any lesser degree of force is virtually nonexist-
ent, so long as the educator's belief in the justification of such force
is not recklessly or negligently acquired.
V. CONCLUSION
The refusal of the Supreme Court in Ingraham v. Wright65 to
extend eighth amendment sanctions against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment should not be viewed as judicial approval of corporal pun-
ishment per se. Neither should the acknowledgment by the Court
that procedural due process is sufficiently guaranteed by the com-
mon law be viewed as carte blanche approval of any procedure for
60. This note maintains, for clarity of analysis, a distinction between civil
and criminal standards available to Nebraska courts. It should be
noted, however, that due to the lack of Nebraska precedent on the cor-
poral punishment issue, a Nebraska court might be persuaded to adopt
the statutory criminal standard as an indicator as to what the civil
common law standard should be. However, in light of the policy
statement of Clasen and the obvious derivation of the Nebraska statute
from the Model Penal Code, the separation of the two standards is
preferable and justifiable.
61. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1413(1) (b) (Supp. 1977).
62. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08 (1), Comment (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
63. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1414(2) (Supp. 1977). See also MODEL PENAL
CODE § 3.09(2), Comment (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
64. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(2), Comment (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
65. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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punishment that a school system may devise. The Court's holdings
-as to both issues were specifically limited to modes of corporal
punishment as they are limited by the common law.
The Nebraska statutes relating to criminal prosecution recognize
a justification for the use of force by educators so long as that force
does not result in serious physical harm or death to the student.
This standard is quite low and would seem to insulate from criminal
liability the vast majority of educators who inflict corporal punish-
ment.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has never dealt directly with a
fact situation involving corporal punishment in the public schools.
Unless the court adopts the statutory criminal standards for the de-
termination of civil liability, the court's last statement on the issue
would indicate that a teacher could be held civilly liable if a jury
determined, after weighing all the circumstances of the case, that
the educator administered unreasonable, unnecessary, or cruel pun-
ishment to a child.
In light of the already broad range of judicial decisions in this
area 66 and the rapidly changing role of the public school in soci-
ety,67 educators, although seemingly secure in their statutory and
common law privileges to administer corporal punishment, should
be aware that someday they could face a jury which will be sympa-
thetic to the pleas of a student in a particular set of circumstances,
resulting in the educator being found civilly, if not criminally, lia-
ble.
But the educator and his or her privilege, regardless of its
source, is only half of the corporal punishment issue. Sadly, the
legal reasoning and case by case adjudication come too late to pro-
tect a battered child from the physical and emotional scars which
could result from the imposition of corporal punishment, no matter
how well-intentioned. Nothing short of a total ban on corporal
punishment will insure the security which every student has a right
to expect in his or her physical well-being.
68
It is indeed staggering that the educational system, although so-
ciety's largest institution and staffed entirely by the college edu-
66. See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 469 (1955).
67. See 1976 Wis. L. REv. 689, 698 nn. 55-58.
68. See Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind. (Porter) 290, 293 (1853) (Stuart, J.):
The husband can no longer moderately chastise his wife; nor,
according to the most recent authorities, the master his servant
or apprentice. Even the degrading cruelties of the naval
service have been arrested. Why the person of the schoolboy,
"with his shining morning face," should be less sacred in the
eye of the law than that of the apprentice or the sailor, is not
easily explained.
232 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 1 (1978)
cated, is unable to arrive at a more ingeneous solution to the disci-
plinary problems of the classroom than the officially sanctioned
paddling of children.
Hopefully, challenges to corporal punishment will continue, in
spite of the travesty of the Supreme Court's pre-revolutionary war
analysis of our Constitution. Meanwhile, educators who rely on
corporal punishment will continue, through their personal example,
to teach the next generation that society's approach to that which
disturbs its order does not include the human intellectual powers
of reason, but the animal instincts of force.
Thomas D. Creighton '78
